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in Jarka, it would appear that the stevedore will have to look to the
Supreme Court" or Congress for the solution to his problem.
DOUGLAS W. MACDOUGAL

AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE-THE
VOLUNTARY-CERTIFIED POLICY DICHOTOMY
Virginia provides the innocent victim of an automobile accident with
the right to a direct action against his tort-feasor's liability insurer.' But
the law of Virginia also provides the defendant insurance company with
a means 2 of avoiding liability for the negligent act of its insured motorist. By proving that the insurance policy which covered the negligently

driven vehicle was obtained through fraud,' an insurance company can
avoid liability to injured third parties, except where the policy itself operates to impose absolute liability on the insurer. 5 Whether an innocent

63Some hope for the employer can now be found in Federal Marine Terminals, Inc.
v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969). There the Court held maritime law imposes
a duty upon the shipowner of due care in providing the stevedoring contractor with a
reasonably safe place to work. Thus the stevedore might have a cause of action in tort
against the shipowner. See Larson, supra note 20, for a discussion of the problems with this
approach.

'VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-380(2) (Repl. Vol. 1970) provides in part:
that in case execution on a judgment against the insured. . . in an action
brought to recover damages for injury sustained . . . occasioned during
the life of the policy or contract shall be returned unsatisfied, then an
action may be maintained against the insurer under the terms of the policy
or contract ....
WA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-336 (Repl. Vol. 1970) provides in part:
All statements . . . in any application for a policy of insurance.

. . shall

be deemed representations and not warranties, and no statement in such
application . . . shall bar a recovery upon a policy of insurance, ...
unless it be clearly proved that such answer or statement was material to
the risk when assumed and was untrue.
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Butler, 203 Va. 575, 125 S.E.2d 823 (1962);
Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Corp. v. Wheeler, 203 Va. 434, 125 S.E.2d 151 (1962).
3
The insured motorist may be either the owner and operator of the negligently driven
vehicle, the named insured, or one who is operating the named insured's vehicle with his
permission, an omnibus insured. A named insured's liability coverage is extended to all who
operate his vehicle with his permission by VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(a) (Supp. 1971).
'An example of such fraud is a material misrepresentation of fact made by the named
insured in applying for the policy. Note 2 supra & note 18 infra.
'When an insurance policy has been certified by an insurance company (Note 16 &
accompanying text infra), the provisions of the Virginia Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act come into force. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-388 to 514 (Repl. Vol. 1967). Section 46.151 1(f) holds the insurer to absolute liability for the negligence of either the named insured
or an omnibus insured. Note 17 infra. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-504(b) (Repl. Vol. 1967).
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victim will succeed in recovering compensation for the injuries to his
person and property can therefore depend on the type of insurance policy
held by the owner of the negligently driven vehicle.
Virginia's motor vehicle code' contemplates two distinct types of liability insurance: that which is voluntarily7 obtained by the insured and
that which is procured as evidence of the insured's financial responsibility." Where an insured has voluntarily contracted with a liability insurer
for coverage on his automobile, it is generally recognized that he did so
for his own benefit:9 to protect himself from having to satisfy out of his
personal assets the judgments of those whom he might injure. However,
when an insured motorist has procured a motor vehicle liability policy"0
to evidence his financial responsibility, he has complied with a statutory
condition" requisite to regaining his driving privilege.
Virginia law requires the forfeiture of this privilege when a motorist
has been convicted of certain driving offenses or has failed to satisfy a
judgment rendered in favor of someone whom he injured with his automobile.' 3 After a motorist has manifested his irresponsibility in either, or
both, of these ways, the state demands, on behalf of possible future
victims, absolute assurance of the motorist's future responsibility." In
most cases 5 this demand is met by obtaining a policy from an insurance
'VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-1 to 555 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
7VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-167.2(b) (Repl. Vol. 1967).
'VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-467, 468, 471 (Repl. Vol. 1967). See Virginia Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saccio, 204 Va. 769, 133 S.E.2d 268 (1963).
9E.g., 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4811 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as APPLEMAN]; Kirk v. Home Indem. Co., 431 F.2d 554, 565 (7th Cir. 1970).
"'The phrase "motor vehicle liability policy" is used artfully. It refers only to those
policies which evidence the insured's financial responsibility. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-389(e)
(Repl. Vol. 1967).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-438(b) (Repl. Vol. 1967) provides in part:
Before granting or restoring a license or registration to any person whose
. . . privilege to operate motor vehicles . . . has been revoked or suspended pursuant to the provisions of §§ 46.1-417, 46.1-418, 46.1-421, and
46.1-442, the Commissioner shall require proof of financial responsibility
"'See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-417 to 424 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
"See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-442 (Repl. Vol. 1967). See Virginia Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Saccio, 204 Va. 769, 133 S.E.2d 268 (1963).
"See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-438, 511 (Repl. Vol. 1967). See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950).
Note 17 infra.
"Evidence of financial responsibility can also be provided by executing a bond, depositing cash or securities, or by filing a certificate of self-insurance, VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1468 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
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company which then certifies"6 to the Department of Motor Vehicles that
its named insured is covered by the required amount of liability insurance.
Whether his tort-feasor's insurance policy has been certified is a matter
of great importance to the innocent victim of an automobile accident, for
after an insurance company has certified a policy it is absolutely liable
for the negligent acts of its named insured and any other person who
7
operates the named insured's vehicle with his permission.1
The certainty of the innocent victim's recovering just compensation
in the certified policy situation is in marked contrast to the uncertainty
of an innocent party's recovering any compensation when injured by a
negligent but voluntarily insured motorist. One of the obstacles that can
be raised by a defendant insurance company to defeat recovery on a
voluntarily obtained policy is that its policyholder made material misrepresentations of fact' s in applying for coverage. This defense in avoidance
"An insurance carrier certifies proof of its named insured's financial responsibility by
filing a written certificate with the Department of Motor Vehicles which states there is a
motor vehicle liability policy in effect for the benefit of the named insured. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.1-471(a) (Repl. Vol. 1967). This policy is then referred to as a "certified" policy as
opposed to a "voluntary" policy. See Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177
F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950).
171n Virginia absolute liability is imposed on the insurer by provision of the Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-511(f) (Repl. Vol. 1967). This
provision of the Act states:
No statement made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of
the terms of the policy shall operate to defeat or avoid the policy so as to
bar recovery within the limits provided in this chapter.
In defining the purpose served by the Virginia Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
It is intended to protect the public from suffering loss through the carelessness of automobile owners who have manifested their financial irresponsibility. It differentiates between car owners who have shown themselves to
be irresponsible, and those who have not. It declares that when those who
carry policies through legal compulsion cause damage in automobile operation, their insurance carriers are absolutely liable for the resulting loss;
but it lays down no such rule in the case of the automobile owner voluntarily carrying such a policy, whose responsibility has never been questioned.
Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793, 798 (4th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950). See Cohen v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 233 App. Div. 340,
252 N.Y.S. 841 (1931).
In general, absolute liability is imposed on the insurer because the certified policy is
issued for the benefit of the public at large as opposed to that of the policyholder. See
APPLEMAN at § 4818 (1962).
8
' VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-336 (Repl. Vol. 1970); note 2 supra. The misrepresentation
of fact must be material to the insurer's risk. A fact is material to an insurer's risk if it
would reasonably influence the decision whether or not to issue a policy. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Haywood, 211 Va. 394, 177 S.E.2d 530 (1970). See generally
Sivertsen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 423 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1970) (insurer not
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of liability to an injured third party was most recently considered by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bernstein v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co."9

Bernstein was seriously injured when the car he was driving was struck
by a pick-up truck operated by Stephens. Bernstein sued both Stephens

and Hurtt, the owner of the truck and the named insured in Nationwide's
liability policy." While the suit was in progress,2 Nationwide sought a
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia seeking to rescind Hurtt's insurance policy ab initio
on the basis of material misrepresentations of fact made by Hurtt on
Nationwide's application form." The form showed that in answering the
questions whether any driver z3 of the vehicle to be insured had had his
liable on policy where applicant for life insurance had materially misrepresented his medical
history).
Virginia law does not require a material misrepresentation of fact to be knowingly or
intentionally made before an insurance company can raise the misrepresentation as a defense in avoidance of liability. Chitwood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 206 Va. 314,
143 S.E.2d 915 (1965).
"Bernstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14,949 (4th Cir., Nov. 24, 1971), rev'g
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 313 F. Supp. 890 (W.D. Va.).
"Who actually owned the truck, Hurtt or Stephens, was an issue of fact which was
hopelessly confused and strongly contested. Nationwide contended that Stephens was the
actual owner of the truck although it had been titled in Hurtt's name apparently to enable
insurance coverage to be obtained under other than certified conditions. Brief for Appellee
at 3. The trial court ruled that Nationwide had not proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that Hurtt had misrepresented the ownership of the truck. 313 F. Supp. at 893.
However, because Stephens was operating the vehicle ostensibly with Hurtt's permission,
he was an additional insured, or omnibus insured, under the liability policy issued by
Nationwide. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(a) (Supp. 1971). See generally State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Arghyris, 189 Va. 913, 55 S.E.2d 16 (1949).
2
'Bernstein was suing Nationwide, Hurtt, and Stephens in the District of Columbia,
the situs of the accident.
2Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. The Hurtt-Nationwide
contract for insurance had been formed in Virginia; therefore Virginia law governed the
action. See Capers v. White, 195 Va. 1123, 81 S.E.2d 597 (1954).
Nationwide had asserted at trial seven instances of material misrepresentations made
by Hurtt in answering questions on the application form; however, the court ruled that
Nationwide's proof established only those discussed in the text infra.
23Because the questions asked of Hurtt had reference to any "driver" rather than being
restricted to the applicant Hurtt, the trial court noted the following caveat:
The point is not raised either by pleadings, memoranda, or argument, and
the court specifically does not pass upon the question of whether or not
the application form used by Nationwide is so broad in its terms that it is
in conflict with the permissive use statute, Virginia Code, Section 38.1381.
313 F. Supp. at 892 n.l.
Hurtt had testified that he thought Nationwide's questions referred only to him, yet
he knew at the time of answering that Stephens would be using the truck. Id. at 893.
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operator's license suspended, or been on an assigned risk plan, or had
been refused insurance coverage within the past three years, Hurtt had
responded, "No". 2 4 However, the trial court found that Hurtt knew at the
time he answered the form's questions that Stephens would be using the
truck, and the questions as they related to Stephens should have been
answered, "Yes".?' The trial court held that Hurtt's negative responses
constituted material misrepresentations of fact and Nationwide could,
therefore, avoid liability to Bernstein by rescinding the policy ab initio.2 '
The defendants, Stephens, Hurtt, and Bernstein, had sought to prevent Nationwide from avoiding its liability by relying on estoppel and the
absolute liability provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Act 28 which provides that no statement made by an insured shall operate
to defeat or avoid an insurance policy. The trial court rejected the estoppel argument and ruled that the absolute liability provision was not available as a defense because Hurtt's insurance policy had not been certified
as proof of his financial responsibility, but had been voluntarily obtained. 2 The trial court drew specific attention to the fact that the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act apply exclusively0
to policies which have been certified as proof of financial responsibility.
As a consequence of this decision, Bernstein, assuming he was awarded
judgment on his negligence action, would be forced to look to the personal assets of Stephens and Hurtt in order to recover any compensation
for his injuries.
In reversing, the Fourth Circuit noted the consistent refusal of the
Virginia Supreme Court to hold an insurer liable on an insurance policy
voluntarily obtained through material misrepresentations of fact .3 Nev2313 F. Supp. at 893.
2

51d.

26

1d.
29

1d. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-511(f) (Repl. Vol. 1967). Notes 5 & 17 supra.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-388 to 514 (Repl. Vol. 1967).
29313 F. Supp. at 893.
301d. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-509 (Repl. Vol. 1967). In 1948 the Virginia legislature
amended the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act in order to remove any doubt as to
its applicability:
It is provided however that the provisions of this act shall not apply to
any policy of insurance except as to liability thereunder incurred after
certification thereof as proof of financial responsibility.
[1948] VA. ACTS ch. 201, 14-A at 438. The quoted language is essentially the same as that
of VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-509 (Repl. Vol. 1967). See Connell v. Indiana Ins. Co., 334 F.2d
993 (4th Cir. 1964); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Arghyris, 189 Va. 913, 55 S.E.2d
16(1949).
3t
' No. 14,949 at 12. See, e.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Indem. Co., 210 Va.
769, 173 S.E.2d 855 (1970); Inter-Ocean Ins. Co. v. Harkrader, 193 Va. 96, 67 S.E.2d 894
(1951).
29
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ertheless, the court held "that in its judgment the deception ought not be
visited upon an innocent and injured third party such as Bernstein.""2
Reversal was necessary, in the opinion of the court, because an insurance
company could not be allowed to condition its liability policy on the
veracity of an applicant's representations as to persons who might use the
vehicle." To allow an insurer to do so would impermissibly restrict the
comprehensive protection intended for the public by the omnibus
clause. 4
The court reasoned that the purpose of the omnibus clause is to extend
a named insured's coverage to all who operate his vehicle with his permission. 5 An insurer could not, therefore, avoid liability to one harmed by
a negligent omnibus driver by relying on the named insured's application
statements if they are materially untrue only with reference to the omnibus driver. Were such a tactic allowed, the public could never be certain
of the intended protection from otherwise uninsured motorists.36 Moreover, the court reasoned that each time an automobile owner permitted
another person to use his vehicle, he would first have to determine
whether the statements he made in applying for coverage retained their
truth in relation to that other person. Otherwise the policyholder himself
could not be certain of insurance protectionY
The reasoning employed by the Fourth Circuit in ruling that Nationwide had attempted to restrict the effect of the omnibus clause appears
to be sound. It seems clear that the legislative purpose underlying the
omnibus clause would be violated if an insurance company could condition the coverage of a policy on the truth of an applicant's representations
as to persons who "might" use the vehicle to be insured." Similarly, if
an insurer could avoid liability for the negligent act of an omnibus driver
by producing an application form containing the vehicle owner's statements which are materially untrue only in relation to the omnibus driver,
the force of the omnibus clause would certainly be diminished. But such
was not the situation presented by the Bernstein case. Hurtt had not been
asked to make representations of such unlimited scope. Rather, he was
asked questions the answers to which were, by his own admission,39
3No. 14,949 at 3. The phrasing of the court in this diversity action is particularly
unfortunate as it comes dangerously close to violating the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), by not following established Virginia statutory and case law.
3No. 14,949 at 5-6.
Uld.
3
1d.
3

51d.
D7d.

3USee note 23 supra.
"Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stephens, 313 F. Supp. 890, 893 (W.D. Va. 1970).
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within his knowledge at the time the questions were posed.
In maintaining that the scope of the questions on Nationwide's application form placed it in conflict with the purpose of the omnibus clause,
the Fourth Circuit relied upon a Wisconsin decision as holding that an
insurer cannot demand representations of an applicant which are not
allowed by state statutes.4 0 However, the court's interpretation of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding in the case of Zepczyk v. Nelson4
appears misconceived. In that case an innocent party sustained injuries
in a collision with an automobile driven by the named insured's son. The
liability insurer's motion for summary judgment was based on a representation made by the named insured in applying for coverage that he would
operate the vehicle 100% of the time." The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
affirming the trial court's denial of the motion, stated:
Even if the insured had knowledge of the 100% clause in the application when he signed it, and that the statement was false.

. . the

insurance company could not avoid liability to an innocent third
person on the grounds that the car was driven by a person other
than the named insured and who
could not be excluded under the
3
provisions of sec. 204.34(I).1
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed, holding that the evidence
was conflicting and presented substantial questions of fact as to whether
the insurer was estopped from relying on the misrepresentations of the
insured." There was no ruling in either court that the questions asked by
the insurer were improper." The Zepczyk decision apparently is authority
for only two propositions: (1) an insurer cannot avoid liability solely on
the ground that the negligent driver was someone other than the named
insured; and (2) a representation by an insured as to percentage of future
use does not constitute a material misrepresentation of fact."
"0 No. 14,949 at 6.
135 Wis. 2d 140, 150 N.W.2d 413 (1967).
12150 N.W.2d at 414.
"Id. at 416.
"Id. at 413.
"Two more recent cases decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, not cited by the
Fourth Circuit, would seem to support the type of inquiry conducted by Nationwide in
Bernstein. See Ryder v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 51 Wis. 2d 318, 187 N.W.2d 176
(1971); Felde v. Kohnke, 50 Wis. 2d 168, 184 N.W.2d 433 (1971).
With regard to the type of questions asked by an insurer and his right to rely on the
answers elicited, see, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 232 N.E.2d 750
(1967); 90 III. App. 2d 356, 232 N.E.2d 750 (1967); Inter-Ocean Ins. Co. v. Harkrader, 193
Va. 96, 67 S.E.2d 894 (1951).
"Wisconsin law does not regard a representation as to percentage of future use as a
misrepresentation of an existing fact. See Kreklow v. Miller, 37 Wis. 2d 12, 154 N.W.2d
243 (1967).
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Consequently, it seems clear that the Zepczyk case was inapposite to
the situation presented to the Fourth Circuit by Bernstein. The insurance
company in Zepczyk had indeed attempted to negate the effect of the

omnibus clause by inserting a 100% driver clause into the insurance con-

tract. 7 Nationwide's contract with Hurtt, however, contained no such
restrictive coverage clause. And Nationwide's attempt to rescind Hurtt's
policy was not based on breach of contractual provision, but on grounds

provided by a Virginia statute" and well recognized by Virginia's courts.
Apart from its failure to deal with the fact of Hurtt's knowledge that
Stephens would be a user of the truck, the court's reasoning as to why
Nationwide was held liable to Bernstein remains troublesome. The court
held that once Nationwide issued the insurance policy to Hurtt it became

"bound by law to honor, for the benefit of the public, its coverage of all
permissive users of the car."49 By such a ruling the court seemed to
confuse the distinctly different rules of liability which govern a certified
policy with those that govern a voluntarily obtained policy. When an
insurance policy has been voluntarily obtained, it is generally recognized
that the innocent victim of an automobile accident is subrogated to the

rights of the negligent policyholder. 0 Thus, Nationwide's liability to
Bernstein would depend on the validity of the Hurtt-Nationwide insur-

ance contract.
Nationwide was held to have established a valid contract defense s' in
the trial court because Hurtt's knowledge of Stephens as a user of the
truck made his representations to Nationwide fraudulent. The Fourth
Circuit registered its agreement that Nationwide had indeed been deceived,5 2 but ignored that fact in reasoning that Nationwide could not be
allowed to avoid liability because it had attempted to restrict the effect
Irlhe Wisconsin omnibus statute specifically includes as additional insureds "persons
while driving or manipulating a motor vehicle, who shall be of an age authorized by law so
to do ......
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 204.34(l)(a) (1957). At the time of the accident involved
in Zepczyk, the named insured's son was 28 years old. 150 N.W.2d at 414.
"sVA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-336 (Repl. Vol. 1970); note 2 supra.
"3No. 14,949 at 6.
OAPPLEMAN at
5

§

4811.

7he injured party is said to "stand in the shoes of the insured" and, therefore, the
contract defense is good to defeat the direct action. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1968); Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied. 339 U.S. 914 (1950); Mertes v.Ballard,
103 III. App. 2d 171, 242 N.E.2d 905 (1968); Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214
(N.D. Iowa 1952); Ampy v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 200 Va. 396, 105 S.E.2d 839 (1958).
In other words, when an insurance policy has been voluntarily contracted for, the rights of

an injured third party are contractual and are derived from those of the policyholder. See,
e.g., 12 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 45:806, 812, 859 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-380(2) (Repl. Vol. 1970); note I supra.
52No. 14,949 at 4.
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of the omnibus clause. Therefore, a ruling that Nationwide was bound
by law to honor its coverage once the policy had been issued seems not
only inconsistent with the focus of the court's reasoning but would also
seem to make the court's stated ground for.reversing superfluous."
While the court of appeals' principal ground for reversal seems to
have been its belief that Nationwide had attempted to restrict the effect
of the omnibus clause, the court offered an additional basis for holding
Nationwide liable to Bernstein. Turning its attention to matters of public
policy, the court observed that
[a]n insurer doubtlessly may for fraud in its procurement rescind
a policy ab initio and withdraw its protection of the named insured
alone. But it ought not to be free indefinitely to rescind the policy
ab initio after the public right has become fixed.5"
Such an unfettered right to rescind would, the court believed, "cloud the
protection the state intends for the public."'
The court's interpretation of the public policy considerations raised
by the Bernstein case is perplexing in light of the seemingly clear statutory
language and case law in Virginia which uphold an insurer's right to
rescind a voluntarily procured policy at any time, given the existence of
material fraud.56 The Virginia legislature has abrogated the liability insurer's right to rescind a policy after injury to an innocent party but only
in the case where the insurance company has certified the policy as proof
of financial responsibility.57 It would appear, therefore, that in discussing
its additional ground for reversal the court confused the differing public
policy considerations which attach to the voluntary-certified policy dichotomy.
That the Fourth Circuit seemed to confuse or ignore the distinctions
between the voluntarily obtained insurance policy and the certified policy
is again evidenced in the reasons advanced by the court for holding Nationwide liable. At the beginning of its discussion of the additional ground
for reversal the court maintained that
[a]s a prerequisite to the registration and licensing of a motor
OThe court appears to equate "bound by law" with absolute liability. Its discussion
of Nationwide's attempt to restrict the effect of the omnibus clause would therefore be
dictum. Id. at 4.
5
'No. 14,949 at 9. It seems clear that the court meant that an insurer should not retain
the right to rescind for an indefinite period after the policy has been issued.
5Id.
5
E.g., notes 2 & 31 supra; Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Echols, 207 Va. 949, 154
S.E.2d 169 (1967); Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 207 Va. 944,
154 S.E.2d 173 (1967).
57
Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-51 l(f) (Repl. Vol. 1967) with note 17 supra.
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vehicle, the State statutes demand assurance of the owner's financial responsibility, accepting as proof a qualifying liability policy.58
Because the State of Virginia allows uninsured motor vehicles to operate
on its roadways, 9 the court's statement cannot find support in the law of
Virginia unless made with reference to a certified policy. Furthermore,
the court ruled that "the general public is a third-party beneficiary to the
contract of insurance."" But, again, this ruling is without apparent support in the law of Virginia unless the contract referred to is one for
certified insurance coverage. Since Virginia does not compel automobile
owners to obtain liability insurance except in the cases where a motorist
has manifested his irresponsibility,"' the public is recognized as a beneficiary only to the certified insurance policy contract. 2 Then followed the
court's conclusion that because Bernstein was a third-party beneficiary
to the Hurtt-Nationwide contract, Nationwide should not be allowed to
rescind the policy ab initio after injury to Bernstein had occurred. 3 In
the opinion of the court, it was Nationwide's obligation to discover
Hurtt's fraud prior to a member of the public being injured, or be barred
from disclaiming liability. 4
The reasoning used by the court in establishing its additional ground
for reversal seems to have been borrowed from that employed by the
California Supreme Court in Barrera v. State Farm Mutual Insurance
Co.6" The California court's decision in Barrerarested almost entirely on
its interpretation of the public policy considerations underlying that
state's financial responsibility law.65 The decision cannot be easily reconciled with the statutory or case law of Virginia as it presently exists.
Barrera explicitly denounced the concept which is integral to the law
governing all third party actions brought in Virginia on voluntarily obtained insurance policies-that the injured party succeeds only to those
contract rights of the named insured. Instead, the California court seems
ONo. 14,949 at 8 (footnote omitted).
§§ 46.1-167.1 to 167.3 (Repl. Vol. 1967). Although a $50.00 fee must
be paid into an uninsured motorists fund at the time a vehicle is registered, and the fund is
to be paid out by the state to any party injured by a negligent, uninsured motorist, the fund
is not considered as insurance. See Drewry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Va.
231, 129 S.E.2d 681 (1963).
cNo. 14,949 at 8.
"Notes II & 13 supra.
'"See, e.g., Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saccio, 204 Va. 769, 133 S.E.2d
268 (1963); APPLEMAN, § 4818, at 205 (1962). See generally Jones v. Mid-South Ins. Co.,
358 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1966).
6No. 14,949 at 9. Note 32 supra.
"No. 14,949 at 11.
e71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969).
C456 P.2d at 682-83.
1Id. at 688-89.
-'VA. CODE ANN.
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to have adopted the theory that the general public is a third-party beneficiary to all automobile insurance contracts." Under such a theory an
injured party's rights against a liability insurer are independent of those
of the named insured." The philosophy of the Barreracase parallels the
law of Virginia only with respect to the certified policy of insurance.
Because the California court interpreted that state's financial responsibility law as making the general public a beneficiary of all insurance
contracts, the duty of an insurance company to investigate the insurability
of all applicants for coverage naturally follows. The insurance companies
of California know that if they do not detect an applicant's fraud before
he negligently injures an innocent party, they are estopped from denying
liability. A similar situation exists in Virginia when an insurance company is faced with the prospect of issuing a certified insurance policy.
However, neither the Virginia legislature nor the courts of the state have
deemed it to be in the public interest to impose a duty to investigate the
insurability of one who voluntarily seeks liability insurance."
The Bernstein decision does not appear to be in harmony with the
statutory or case law of Virginia. Because the Fourth Circuit ignored the
trial court's finding that Hurtt knew Stephens would be a user of the
truck, the reasoning used by the court in reversing, on the ground that
Nationwide had attempted to restrict the effect of the omnibus clause, is
of uncertain validity. But the soundness of the court's additional basis for
reversal, that Bernstein had the status of a third-party beneficiary to the
Hurtt-Nationwide insurance contract and therefore Nationwide's liability
became fixed at the moment of his injury, is most uncertain. By confusing
the distinctly different rules of liability which govern the voluntarycertified policy dichotomy, the court seems to have endeavored to arrive
at an outcome which it held to be most consistent with the demands of
public policy and the function of liability insurance: Bernstein, an inno"'Throughout its quite lengthy opinion the California court maintained that the public
policy underlying that state's financial responsibility law requires the recognition of a duty
on the part of a liability insurer to the members of the general public, as a class of potential
victims, to assure the validity of the insurance contract which protects them from risk of
death or injury. The court insisted that due to the quasi-public nature of the insurance
business, the rights and obligations of a liability insurer cannot be determined solely on
contract principles. Id. at 681-82. Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 25 Utah
2d 427, 483 P.2d 892 (1971); Bailey v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 474 P.2d 746 (Ore.
1970).
"'See 12 G. CoucH, supra note 52 at § 45:806, 816 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1964).
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The question of an insurance company's duty to investigate the truthfulness of an
applicant's answers has not come before the Virginia Supreme Court. However, in the case
of Carrico v. Pennsylvania Nat'l. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 756 (1964), the Circuit Court of
Amherst County ruled in favor of the insurance company's right to rely on the applicant's
representations. A petition of error was filed; the Supreme Court of Virginia denied the writ
saying the judgment was plainly correct.
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compensation for his injury from
cent, injured third party should recover
71
his tort-feasor's liability insurer.
While a statute could be drawn which would adequately protect the
public by suspending an insurer's right to rescind a voluntarily obtained
policy ab initio when injury to an innocent party has occurred, and allowing the right to remain as between the insurer and the named insured,
there are no such provisions in the present Virginia statutes. The legislature has acted in this regard only to protect the public from those motorists who have displayed their irresponsibility by requiring an insurer to
certify its coverage of such policyholders and imposing absolute liability.
'Until such time as the legislature acts to extend the protection provided
by the certified policy, the law of Virginia would seem to sanction the
possibility of innocent, injured victims of negligent motorists going without any compensation.
See addendum for disposition on rehearing.
BRUCE L. PHILLIPS

7
But see Bryant v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 407 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1969), where the court
said in applying the law of Virginia:
The State of Virginia, whose law we apply, has in no way intimated that
all automobile accidents are to be compensable and that technical defenses
are to be stricken with a view toward advancing the universality of insurance coverage. Even if this is a desirable goal, Virginia's explicit and
consistent recognition of the defense of noncooperation . . . makes it
plain that we should not achieve it by judicial fiat.
Id. at 581.

